peer-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (git diffs, PR bodies, and file contents) which can contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdStep 2 (git diff, gh pr view/diff, and file/directory reading). - Boundary markers: Present. Instructions are wrapped in
<untrusted_diff>or<untrusted_files>tags with explicit instructions to treat them as data only. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
ghCLI,gitCLI,npm(to install external tools), and spawns subagents or external CLIs (Copilot/Codex) that could potentially be influenced by the data. It also includes file-editing capabilities (Edittool) during the apply phase. - Sanitization: Argument validation is performed on PR numbers and branch names using regex. A pre-flight secret scan (
references/secret-scan.md) is implemented to detect and redact credentials before sending data to external CLIs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill contains a pre-flight secret scan to prevent credential leak, it explicitly notes that Copilot's CLI ignores stdin in non-interactive mode. Consequently, prompt content (including potentially unredacted secrets) is passed via the
-pflag on the command line. This makes the data visible to other local users via process monitoring tools likepsor/proc/<pid>/cmdline. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands (
git,gh,npm) and invokes external binaries (copilot,codex). While it validates arguments, it allows the assistant to execute complex Bash blocks involving temporary file creation and environment manipulation (WORKDIR). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation suggests installing external packages (
@github/copilot-cli,@openai/codex). These are well-known services, but the skill relies on the user to ensure the provenance and version pinning of these tools.
Audit Metadata