voice-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
install_host.pyscript modifies the host environment configuration (~/.claude/settings.json) to install persistent hooks. These hooks (SessionStart,PostToolUse) execute a Python runner (claude_hook.py) on specific application events. While the script implements a sidecar for uninstallation and requires user confirmation, this establishes persistence within the host environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts, including
install_host.pyand test helpers, execute shell commands viasubprocess.runto manage the installation, run scripts, and conduct tests. The installer script also performs significant filesystem operations, such as creating directory structures, replacing configuration files, and managing backups in the user's home directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/_bootstrap.pyfile dynamically modifies the Pythonsys.pathto locate and import therwliblibrary from sibling directories. Additionally,tests/run.pyuses the__import__function to dynamically load and execute test modules. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdinstructions define a specific 'Taste Interviewer' persona for the agent. This roleplay is intended to extract writing style DNA from the user through structured questioning and pushes the agent to adopt a firm, truth-seeking posture. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted writing samples provided by the user. It contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (e.g., instructions hidden in markdown comments). However, the skill implements a mandatory 'P0 contamination gate' in
measure_voice.pyandaudit_voice.pywhich explicitly scans for and blocks execution if common AI directive overrides or hidden unicode artifacts are detected. - Ingestion points: Writing samples loaded from the local filesystem by
measure_voice.py,audit_voice.py, andlearn_edits.py. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on specific regex-based detection of 'P0' fingerprints (e.g., 'ignore all previous instructions') to identify malicious content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read/write local files and install persistent hooks in the host application configuration.
- Sanitization: The
P0gate serves as a primary sanitization layer, exiting with an error if suspicious patterns are identified in the processed data.
Audit Metadata