video-cut

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of subprocess.run to execute external binaries including ffmpeg, ffprobe, and yt-dlp. These are fundamental to the skill's primary purpose of video editing and rendering.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file scripts/transcribe.py uses importlib.util to dynamically load and execute a Python module from a relative file path (../video-understand/scripts/transcribe.py). While this facilitates code reuse between sibling skills, it introduces a dependency on the integrity of the external skill directory.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: External media downloaded via yt-dlp from user-provided URLs and the resulting transcripts generated by faster-whisper (referenced in scripts/analyze.py and scripts/verify_cut.py).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used when the agent reads the transcript to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities through shell execution of ffmpeg and yt-dlp (found in scripts/cut_render.py and scripts/selfcheck_frames.py).
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the transcript text or media metadata is implemented before the content is processed by the agent to make editorial decisions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 11:30 AM