video-cut
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.runto execute external binaries includingffmpeg,ffprobe, andyt-dlp. These are fundamental to the skill's primary purpose of video editing and rendering. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/transcribe.pyusesimportlib.utilto dynamically load and execute a Python module from a relative file path (../video-understand/scripts/transcribe.py). While this facilitates code reuse between sibling skills, it introduces a dependency on the integrity of the external skill directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: External media downloaded via
yt-dlpfrom user-provided URLs and the resulting transcripts generated byfaster-whisper(referenced inscripts/analyze.pyandscripts/verify_cut.py). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used when the agent reads the transcript to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities through shell execution of
ffmpegandyt-dlp(found inscripts/cut_render.pyandscripts/selfcheck_frames.py). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the transcript text or media metadata is implemented before the content is processed by the agent to make editorial decisions.
Audit Metadata