wk-buildkite
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, specifically Buildkite build logs and pipeline metadata, which could contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the outputs of
bk build view(JSON metadata) andbk job log(text-based logs). - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not define specific delimiters or guardrails to wrap this external content when it is interpolated into the agent's prompt.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to a restricted
Bashtool (limited to thebkCLI suite) and theAskUserQuestiontool. - Sanitization: The skill includes instructions to strip ANSI escape sequences and internal platform metadata (e.g.,
_bk;t=...markers) from logs before analysis, but does not provide prompt-level escaping for the content itself. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
bkCLI for all CI operations. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration grants access tobk config get, a subcommand capable of retrieving local configuration values, which may include sensitive authentication tokens or environment settings. While the skill's instructions explicitly forbid the agent from extracting or misusing these secrets, the technical capability to access them exists within the defined tool scope.
Audit Metadata