wk-devcontainer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to mount the sensitive host directory
~/.claudeinto the devcontainer environment (- ~/.claude:/root/.claude). This directory contains the agent's internal history, conversation transcripts, and memory, making this sensitive information accessible to any code or user within the containerized environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted project files without sanitization or safety boundaries.
- Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read external files including
.buildkite/docker/compose.yml,config/database.yml,.ruby-version, andGemfile(SKILL.md, Step 1). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to treat these files as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides the agent with the ability to write Docker and Compose configuration files and execute shell commands through the
docker composeinterface (SKILL.md, Steps 2-4 and Teardown sections). - Sanitization: Absent. Extracted data from the project files is interpolated directly into generated configurations and potential command executions without validation or escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata