wk-pr-break
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its reliance on untrusted external data to drive its planning logic.
- Ingestion points: In Stage 1, the skill fetches PR descriptions, inline review comments, review summaries, and conversation comments via the GitHub API (
gh api). It also reads linked Jira tickets. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to protect the model from instructions embedded within the ingested comment text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including writing to the local filesystem, creating new git branches, committing code, and opening new Pull Requests on GitHub.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the text content from external comments or tickets is described before the data is used to identify 'natural seams' or 'scope signals'.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated shell operations to manage the repository state and PR lifecycle.
- It uses
gitand the GitHub CLI (gh) to modify the environment, including converting PRs to drafts, cutting new branches, and applying diffs from the original PR. - Risk Mitigation: These operations are gated by a mandatory user approval step in Stage 6. Furthermore, the 'Auto mode' is restricted to generating a static plan file and is prohibited from performing autonomous execution, reducing the risk of unintended destructive actions.
Audit Metadata