ai-automation-workflows
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bash(belt *)tool andsubprocess.runin Python to execute thebeltCLI for AI operations. It also provides examples of modifyingcrontaband writing to system log directories like/var/log/, which are standard for automation but involve sensitive system commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external resources and installation scripts hosted on
inference.shdomains and its official GitHub repository (e.g.,https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md). These are documented as part of the setup for the intended CLI tool. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: One example script (
monitored_workflow.sh) demonstrates sending command results and error messages to an external webhook (https://your-webhook.com/alert). While presented as an alerting mechanism, this pattern could be misused to exfiltrate data if configured with a malicious endpoint. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It features multiple scripts that ingest untrusted data (e.g.,
$(cat $file)indata_processing.shor$INPUT_TEXTinconditional_workflow.sh) and interpolate this data directly into LLM prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: Files in
./data/rawand shell arguments. - Boundary markers: None; data is directly concatenated into prompt strings.
- Capability inventory: Uses
beltCLI to call external models and writes output to the local file system. - Sanitization: None present in the examples.
Audit Metadata