ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface where external or untrusted data is interpolated into AI model prompts.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(e.g., 'Blog to Video Pipeline' and 'YouTube Short Pipeline' sections). - Boundary markers: Absent. Untrusted inputs such as
<blog-content>,<script-text>, and<point-text>are placed directly into JSON input payloads for models like Claude without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill employs the
Bashtool to executebelt app runcommands, which interact with remote AI services and write outputs to local JSON files. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not demonstrate escaping or validation of the content before it is processed by the AI models.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches guidelines and installation instructions from the official repository of the inference-sh platform.
- Evidence: Downloads from
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdand refers tonpx skills addcommands for platform-specific extensions.
Audit Metadata