ai-voice-cloning
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to retrieve installation instructions from a remote GitHub repository (
github.com/inference-sh/skills) and identifies multiple external skill dependencies. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions command the agent to install external code using
npx skills addfor several third-party extensions, includingbelt-sh/cliand various components frominference-sh/skills. It also facilitates the execution of remote applications via thebelt app runinterface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill functionality is built around shell command execution using the
beltCLI tool for managing sessions (belt login) and running inference tasks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User input provided to the skill (via
promptortextfields) is sent to theinference.shremote platform. This creates a potential for data exfiltration if the agent processes sensitive information through these voice synthesis tools. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted text data for synthesis.
- Ingestion points: Text fields within the JSON payloads for the
belt app runcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Inputs are encapsulated within JSON structures, which provides a basic boundary but does not prevent instruction following by the underlying model.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via the
belttool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or safety filtering applied to the text before transmission.
Audit Metadata