javascript-sdk

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation and reference files (specifically SKILL.md and references/tool-builder.md) provide code examples that demonstrate the use of eval() to process mathematical expressions from tool arguments. While intended for a calculator tool, eval() is a high-risk function that executes arbitrary strings as code.
  • [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation instructs users to install external skills via commands like npx skills add belt-sh/cli. These references point to third-party sources whose security cannot be verified within the context of this skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SDK establishes a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its data handling and agent capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted external data via agent.sendMessage content, client.run input objects, and multiple file upload mechanisms (local paths, buffers, blobs, and data URIs).
  • Boundary markers: The provided code patterns and documentation lack instructions or implementations for using boundary markers or system instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in processed data.
  • Capability inventory: Agents built using these patterns have access to high-impact tools, including codeExecution(true), webSearch(true), webhookTool for external network operations, and comprehensive file management capabilities.
  • Sanitization: Documentation examples do not demonstrate sanitization, validation, or escaping of external inputs before they are processed by the LLM or passed to executable tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 05:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — javascript-sdk