javascript-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Documentation and reference files (specifically
SKILL.mdandreferences/tool-builder.md) provide code examples that demonstrate the use ofeval()to process mathematical expressions from tool arguments. While intended for a calculator tool,eval()is a high-risk function that executes arbitrary strings as code. - [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation instructs users to install external skills via commands like
npx skills add belt-sh/cli. These references point to third-party sources whose security cannot be verified within the context of this skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SDK establishes a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its data handling and agent capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted external data via
agent.sendMessagecontent,client.runinput objects, and multiple file upload mechanisms (local paths, buffers, blobs, and data URIs). - Boundary markers: The provided code patterns and documentation lack instructions or implementations for using boundary markers or system instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in processed data.
- Capability inventory: Agents built using these patterns have access to high-impact tools, including
codeExecution(true),webSearch(true),webhookToolfor external network operations, and comprehensive file management capabilities. - Sanitization: Documentation examples do not demonstrate sanitization, validation, or escaping of external inputs before they are processed by the LLM or passed to executable tools.
Audit Metadata