press-release-writing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing the
beltCLI vianpx skills add belt-sh/cliand references installation instructions hosted on a remote GitHub repository (raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npx skills addto incorporate external packages such asinference-sh/skills@web-searchandinference-sh/skills@prompt-engineering. This allows code from external sources to be added to the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI commands for authentication (belt login) and running specialized research applications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it retrieves data from external search providers (Tavily and Exa) to assist with fact-checking. Malicious content within the search results could potentially override agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: Output from research tools including
tavily/search-assistant,exa/search, andexa/answer(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not instruct the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permission to execute shell commands via the
belttool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external search results is performed before processing.
Audit Metadata