twitter-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for installation and documentation, specifically pointing to the inference.sh GitHub repository (
inference-sh/skills) and instructions hosted atraw.githubusercontent.com. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions heavily rely on executing shell commands via the
beltCLI to interact with the inference.sh API apps (e.g.,belt app run x/post-tweet). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes apps for retrieving external content, such as
x/post-getandx/user-get, which ingest untrusted data from Twitter into the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Retrieval of tweet content and user profile data via
x/post-getandx/user-get. - Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat retrieved text as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool with thebeltCLI to perform network operations and social media actions. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization applied to the content retrieved from Twitter before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata