twitter-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources for installation and documentation, specifically pointing to the inference.sh GitHub repository (inference-sh/skills) and instructions hosted at raw.githubusercontent.com.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions heavily rely on executing shell commands via the belt CLI to interact with the inference.sh API apps (e.g., belt app run x/post-tweet).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes apps for retrieving external content, such as x/post-get and x/user-get, which ingest untrusted data from Twitter into the agent's context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Retrieval of tweet content and user profile data via x/post-get and x/user-get.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat retrieved text as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to the Bash tool with the belt CLI to perform network operations and social media actions.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization applied to the content retrieved from Twitter before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 05:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — twitter-automation