ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires and references external tools and documentation for its core functionality.
- Suggests the installation of a third-party CLI tool (
belt-sh/cli) vianpx. - References external installation guidelines hosted on GitHub:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to chain multiple AI models together (e.g., research -> script -> video), which creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious payload from an upstream source could influence downstream actions.
- Ingestion points: The pipeline ingests data from external sources such as web search results via
tavily/search-assistantand generated scripts from LLMs likeopenrouter/claude-sonnet-45. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided in the pipeline commands to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions that might be embedded in the output of these external models.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the
beltCLI, write to local files (e.g.,> script.json), and perform network operations through the inference platform. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present to filter content generated by upstream models before it is passed as input to subsequent video, image, or audio generation tools.
Audit Metadata