elevenlabs-stt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external CLI tool and other platform-specific skills using commands like
npx skills add belt-sh/cliandnpx skills add inference-sh/skills@.... It also references a remote installation script athttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. These dependencies are necessary for the skill's core functionality of interacting with the inference.sh service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the
beltCLI (e.g.,belt login,belt app run). The execution environment is restricted by theallowed-toolsconfiguration to only allow commands starting withbelt, which mitigates the risk of arbitrary command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external audio and video files, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if the transcribed content contains instructions for the AI.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts
audioandvideo_urlparameters in JSON inputs to fetch external media for transcription. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided in the examples to warn the agent about ignoring embedded instructions within the transcribed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI to perform transcription and can pipe output to other tools (e.g.,infsh/caption-videos), which could potentially be influenced by malicious content in the audio. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the transcription output before it is returned to the agent or used in downstream tasks.
Audit Metadata