product-hunt-launch
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to install a third-party CLI tool (
belt-sh/cli) and execute remote applications (e.g.,falai/flux-dev-lora,tavily/search-assistant) hosted on theinference.shplatform. These applications execute logic on remote infrastructure that is not within the pre-approved trusted list. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill points users to an external installation script and guidelines hosted on GitHub (
inference-sh/skills) to set up the necessary environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
beltcommand via the Bash tool to perform various tasks. This includesbelt loginfor credential management andbelt app runfor triggering remote tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external search tools (
tavily/search-assistantandexa/search). - Ingestion points: Data enters the context from the outputs of the search assistant and Exa search commands in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to use the results for preparation and strategy without explicit isolation of the untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool and can execute shell commands via
belt. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the external search data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata