text-to-speech
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions guide the agent to construct shell commands using user-supplied text for synthesis. This pattern creates a vulnerability surface where malicious input could attempt to escape the command structure.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for the
textfield in shell command arguments (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or sanitization instructions are provided in the examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI operations. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for escaping special characters or validating user input before it is passed to the tool.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation scripts required for its operation.
- Evidence: Links to installation instructions at
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.mdand references thebelt-sh/cliskill vianpx. - Context: These references point to established services and are consistent with the stated purpose of integrating with the inference.sh platform.
Audit Metadata