bmad-sprint-run
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains multiple sections of instructions specifically designed to override the agent's interactive safety protocols. In
SKILL.md, it commands 'Never ask for permission to continue' and 'no confirmation prompts'. Inreferences/companion-mode.md, the injected system prompt explicitly states 'OVERRIDE all interactive patterns', 'skip confirmation gates', 'NEVER ask questions', and 'Asking a question = task failure'. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Auto-continue on pending questions' mechanism described in
companion-mode.mdis a programmatic injection attack that automatically resumes the session with forced 'Yes' or 'Resolve autonomously' responses whenever the agent attempts to halt for human decision-making or safety confirmations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic in
references/orchestration-steps.mdinvolves executing shell commands derived from repository files (e.g.,CLAUDE.md,package.json,Cargo.toml). This includes running typechecks, tests, and infrastructure checks (likedocker compose) without human review of the commands being executed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation in
companion-mode.mdadvocates for the use of the--dangerously-skip-permissionsCLI flag, which removes the platform's security boundaries for file system access and tool execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata