cover-letter-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the cover-letter generation process.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests text from CV/resume files (PDF, Markdown, LaTeX, TXT) and job descriptions (pasted text or file paths) in Step 0 and Step 1. It also performs a recursive repository scan for supplementary context.
- Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" markers defined to separate the untrusted data from the system prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
pdftotext,sed,pandoc) and write new Markdown files to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or filtering of the extracted text before it is synthesized into the profile used for writing the cover letter.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell utilities to extract and transform text from files.
- Evidence: In Step 1, the skill uses
pdftotextfor PDF extraction,sedfor regex-based cleaning of LaTeX files, andpandocfor document conversion. While these are legitimate uses for the skill's primary purpose, they involve processing potentially complex file formats provided by users.
Audit Metadata