Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime modification of thepypdflibrary's internal logic. - Evidence: The
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction reassigns theget_inheritedmethod ofpypdf.generic.DictionaryObjectto a local wrapper function at runtime. This dynamic execution technique is used to bypass a bug in the library's handling of selection list fields. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting and processing untrusted data from PDF files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from external PDFs via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdftotextacross multiple scripts and instructions. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore or isolate potentially malicious commands embedded within the extracted PDF text.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides the agent with file system access (read/write) and instructions to execute shell commands based on the interpreted content of the documents.
- Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize or validate extracted text or field metadata before it is used in the agent's context or further processing steps.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and encourages the execution of various command-line utilities for PDF processing.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreference.mdcontain specific usage instructions and examples for executingqpdf,pdftotext,pdfimages, andpdftkusing shell subprocesses.
Audit Metadata