sandcastle
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs 'Bang-substitution' (
!command) syntax inreferences/ticket-sources.mdto execute thegh(GitHub) CLI tool on the host system at load or prep time. This mechanism runs shell commands locally to fetch ticket data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources (GitHub issues, Linear tickets) which is then interpolated into the agent's implement prompt.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from GitHub Issues via
gh issue listand Linear via API/MCP (described inreferences/ticket-sources.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when inlining ticket titles, bodies, and comments into the implement prompt.
- Capability inventory: The sandboxed agents have the capability to write code, execute tests, and perform reviews. The host-side orchestrator has the ability to push git branches and open pull requests.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external ticket content before it is processed by the AI agents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
@ai-hero/sandcastlepackage and instructs the user to runnpx sandcastle initandpnpm sandcastle, which involves downloading and executing code from external registries. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The workflow requires the use of sensitive tokens (
GH_TOKEN,CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN). The instructions suggest storing these in a.envfile, which is a standard practice but ensures the skill has access to high-privilege credentials.
Audit Metadata