chapter-briefs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from
outline/outline.yml,outline/subsection_briefs.jsonl, andGOAL.mdto construct its output brief records. - Ingestion points: Data is read from
outline/outline.yml,outline/subsection_briefs.jsonl, andGOAL.mdvia theload_yaml,read_jsonl, and_read_goalfunctions. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit prompt boundary markers, but the processing script includes logic to filter out placeholder text and comments from the ingested goal file.
- Capability inventory: The skill is limited to reading local configuration files and writing a JSONL artifact; it lacks capabilities for network access, subprocess spawning, or system-level modification.
- Sanitization: The
_check_no_placeholdersfunction validates that the generated output does not contain common placeholder strings such as "TODO", "(placeholder)", or ellipses. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run.pydynamically modifies the Python environment's module search path to load project-specific utilities. - Evidence: The script uses
sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root))to resolve and import the internaltooling.commonlibrary based on the location of anAGENTS.mdmarker file.
Audit Metadata