triggers

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines various triggers (Email, Http, WebSocket, Kafka, NATS, Postgres, MQTT, SQS, GCP, Azure) that ingest data from external, potentially untrusted sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in a trigger payload (such as an email body or webhook message) to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through fields like parsed_email, raw_email, and various message payloads defined in the trigger schemas (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or guidance for the agent to treat trigger-supplied data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to execute scripts or flows (script_path), interact with S3 object storage via the wmill SDK, and run CLI commands (wmill sync push).
  • Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the content of the incoming trigger data before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of wmill sync push and wmill sync pull CLI commands. The instructions include a safety warning, advising the agent to only run the destructive push command when explicitly requested by the user, which mitigates the risk of accidental execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 06:33 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — triggers