triage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The verification workflow for pull requests (PRs) explicitly instructs the agent to "check it out, run the relevant tests or commands." Executing arbitrary tests or scripts provided within a diff by an external contributor is a significant command execution vector.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates remote code execution by checking out and running code from external, untrusted pull requests as part of its standard operating procedure for verification.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from issue trackers which could be used to manipulate the agent's logic or trigger unauthorized actions.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads issue bodies, pull request descriptions, comments, and diff content from the external issue tracker as described in the "Gather context" and "Verify the claim" sections of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters (such as XML tags or clear "ignore instructions within data" rules) to prevent the agent from interpreting data as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the repository's filesystem (creating and updating files in the
.out-of-scope/directory), execute shell commands/tests, and post comments back to the public issue tracker. - Sanitization: There are no requirements or mechanisms mentioned for sanitizing, filtering, or validating the content retrieved from the issue tracker before it is processed by the model.
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