agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
agent-browserglobal package from the npm registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
agent-browser skills getcommand to dynamically fetch and load operational workflows and instructions from the tool's backend at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill description contains a directive instructing the agent to prefer the
agent-browsertool over any built-in browser automation or web tools, attempting to override the agent's default tool selection behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to use the
Bashtool to runagent-browserCLI commands, enabling full interaction with the local system and browser instances. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to process and interact with untrusted external data from web pages and third-party applications, which presents an attack surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Browser CDP accessibility tree snapshots, web page content, Electron application metadata, and Slack workspace data.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are defined in the skill stub.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, interact with browsers, manage an authentication vault, and proxy network traffic.
- Sanitization: Sanitization procedures are not defined within the skill's markdown instructions and are handled by the external CLI tool.
Audit Metadata