codex-app-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/probe_app_server.pyutilizes thesubprocessmodule to execute the localcodexbinary for schema generation and runtime discovery. The script securely passes arguments as lists, avoiding shell injection vulnerabilities, and is designed to probe the installed environment as part of the skill's stated purpose. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references documentation and archival README files from official OpenAI repositories on GitHub (
github.com/openai) and official developer domains (developers.openai.com). These are treated as trusted sources for technical references and do not represent a security risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes JSON metadata from the local Codex service and technical documentation from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data may enter the agent's context through the output of
scripts/probe_app_server.pyor remote README content fetched from GitHub. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters to isolate ingested technical metadata from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables local command execution via the
codexCLI and interaction with the App Server's JSON-RPC interface. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested JSON data, relying on the model's standard guardrails.
Audit Metadata