fal-seedance

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompt strings and interpolates them into JSON payloads for remote video generation on the fal.ai platform.
  • Ingestion points: Prompts are ingested via the --prompt and --prompt-file arguments in the scripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.py script.
  • Boundary markers: The script does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate user input, leaving the agent and the remote model susceptible to instructions embedded within the prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network requests to fal.ai (API calls and media uploads) and write files to the local filesystem (MP4 video files and JSON receipts).
  • Sanitization: The skill performs no escaping or content validation on the prompt strings before transmitting them to the external provider.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the flow of sensitive authentication data from the local environment to a remote service.
  • Evidence: scripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.py reads a secret API key (FAL_KEY) from the sensitive local path ~/.secrets/fal/env and transmits it to the fal.ai service for authentication.
  • Evidence: The script contains hardcoded absolute filesystem paths (e.g., /Users/dobby/GitHub/scripts/sync/...) which reveal the local directory structure of the development environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external packages and downloads media content at runtime.
  • Evidence: The SKILL.md documentation instructs users to install the fal-client package from the official PyPI registry.
  • Evidence: The scripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.py script uses urllib.request.urlopen to download generated video files from fal.ai CDN URLs and save them to the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 05:40 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fal-seedance