fal-seedance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompt strings and interpolates them into JSON payloads for remote video generation on the fal.ai platform.
- Ingestion points: Prompts are ingested via the
--promptand--prompt-filearguments in thescripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.pyscript. - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate user input, leaving the agent and the remote model susceptible to instructions embedded within the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network requests to fal.ai (API calls and media uploads) and write files to the local filesystem (MP4 video files and JSON receipts).
- Sanitization: The skill performs no escaping or content validation on the prompt strings before transmitting them to the external provider.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the flow of sensitive authentication data from the local environment to a remote service.
- Evidence:
scripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.pyreads a secret API key (FAL_KEY) from the sensitive local path~/.secrets/fal/envand transmits it to the fal.ai service for authentication. - Evidence: The script contains hardcoded absolute filesystem paths (e.g.,
/Users/dobby/GitHub/scripts/sync/...) which reveal the local directory structure of the development environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external packages and downloads media content at runtime.
- Evidence: The
SKILL.mddocumentation instructs users to install thefal-clientpackage from the official PyPI registry. - Evidence: The
scripts/fal_seedance_ref2v.pyscript usesurllib.request.urlopento download generated video files from fal.ai CDN URLs and save them to the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata