media-toolkit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to read API keys from a specific local file path at
~/.secrets/aipodcasting/envand checks several environment variables (WIN_API_KEY, AIP_API_KEY, etc.) to authenticate requests to the backend media processing service inscripts/media_toolkit_lib/api.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/media_toolkit_lib/io.pyexecutes a local binary located at~/GitHub/scripts/bin/upload-media(or a path defined by the MEDIA_UPLOAD_BIN environment variable) usingsubprocess.runto handle file uploads. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
transcribecommand fetches transcript data from remote URLs and returns the text directly to the agent's context. This presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if the fetched transcript contains malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: The transcribe function in
scripts/media_toolkit.pycallsapi_client.fetch_text()to retrieve content fromtranscript_url. - Boundary markers: The output is returned as raw text or within a JSON object without explicit boundary delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute local commands via
subprocess.runand write files to the local system viawrite_json_fileinscripts/media_toolkit_lib/io.py. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the fetched transcript text before it is returned to the agent context.
Audit Metadata