notion
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation instructions suggest using
curl -fsSL https://ntn.dev | bash. This pattern involves piping a remote script directly into a shell interpreter, allowing for arbitrary code execution without integrity verification or user review of the script content.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on the externalntnCLI tool, which it suggests downloading fromhttps://ntn.devor installing via thenpmregistry. These sources are external to the controlled environment and represent a dependency on third-party infrastructure.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing shell commands using thentnCLI tool. This provides a broad capability for the agent to interact with the host system and the Notion API, which could be abused if the agent is misled.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external Notion workspaces.\n - Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
ntn pages get,ntn api v1/data_sources/<ds-id>/query, andntn api v1/searchwhich retrieve user-controlled text from Notion.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the retrieved content as data rather than instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including reading/writing pages, managing comments, and uploading files.\n
- Sanitization: There are no mechanisms described to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from Notion before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://ntn.dev - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata