omh-ralplan-driver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an orchestration workflow where an agent reads external files—including project source code, 'context packages' (context.md), and reference materials—and incorporates their content into instructions for sub-agents via the
delegate_tasktool. This ingestion of potentially untrusted data creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in those files could influence or override the sub-agents' behavior. - Ingestion points: External project files,
context.md,PRINCIPLES.md, and local source checkouts (as specified inSKILL.mdand the templates inreferences/). - Boundary markers: Templates utilize role headers (e.g.,
[omh-role:planner]), but the skill does not explicitly mandate the use of delimiters or 'ignore' warnings for the content of the ingested files. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator utilizes
delegate_taskfor tool invocation, terminal access for git operations, and file system writes for artifact generation. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation of external file content is mentioned before it is interpolated into sub-agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
SKILL.mdunder the 'P9' pitfall section, the skill provides a 'Pre-flight checklist' that instructs the agent to execute several shell commands (git remote -v,git fetch --all --tags,git rev-list, andgit describe) in a terminal to verify the freshness of a local source tree before proceeding with design tasks.
Audit Metadata