xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
recalc.pyscript automatically configures a LibreOffice macro by writing a StarBasic script (Module1.xba) to the local application configuration directory (~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/or~/.config/libreoffice/). This macro is subsequently executed via thesofficebinary to perform headless workbook recalculations. This process modifies the user's host environment configuration and executes dynamically generated script content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from
.xlsxfiles usingpandasandopenpyxlas part of its data analysis and style validation workflows. If the agent is instructed to analyze a file provided by an untrusted source, instructions embedded in the cell data could potentially influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: File reading occurs in
build_xlsx.py(viaload_workbook),validate_xlsx.py(viaload_workbook), and recommended pandas workflows inSKILL.md(pd.read_excel). - Boundary markers: Absent. No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate cell data from the agent's instructions during processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file writing (
openpyxl), script chaining via subprocesses (recalc.py,validate_xlsx.py), and environment modification through macro setup. - Sanitization: While
validate_xlsx.pychecks for 'forbidden terms', this is a quality-focused style filter rather than a security sanitizer for LLM prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.run()acrossbuild_xlsx.py,validate_xlsx.py, andrecalc.pyto chain the execution of internal Python scripts and thesoffice(LibreOffice) binary. While these calls do not useshell=True, they execute binaries and scripts based on provided file paths to handle formula evaluation and linting.
Audit Metadata