recommit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository's git history which could be manipulated to influence agent behavior. * Ingestion points: The agent reads
git logandgit diffoutputs in the first step of the workflow defined inSKILL.md. * Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat content from the git history as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands during the history rebuild and validation phases inREBUILD.md. * Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from the git history before it is used to design the commit sequence and validation plan. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive execution of shell and git commands to manipulate the repository state. * It uses complex git operations including
git rebase -i --autosquash,git applywith binary patches, andgit worktreemanagement. * It references an external toolgit-hunkfor granular staging of changes. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The validation process executes shell commands that are dynamically generated by the agent during the planning phase. * Evidence: In
REBUILD.md, the validation loop executes<checks planned for this commit>in a temporary worktree. These checks are strings generated by the agent inSKILL.mdStep 1.
Audit Metadata