dispatch-new-session
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions require the agent to bypass standard safety and permission guardrails when spawning new sessions. It explicitly mandates the use of flags such as
--allow-dangerously-skip-permissionsfor Claude-based harnesses and--yolofor Codex-based harnesses, effectively disabling safety protocols in the target environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using CLI tools including
herdr,claude,codex, andpi. These commands are used to manage workspaces, create tabs, and spawn new agent processes. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates shell commands at runtime by concatenating user-selected models and harness configurations. It uses logic to derive CLI flags based on the chosen harness, such as
-m <model>or identifiers reported bypi --list-models. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data via the
taskargument and interpolates it into critical operational contexts without sanitization. - Ingestion points: The
[task]argument provided by the user in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None; the task brief is passed directly to the new agent and used to derive operational identifiers.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
herdr,claude,codex, andpiCLI tools. - Sanitization: None; the skill instructions direct the agent to "Derive a short tab label and unique agent name from the task," which creates a surface for command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata