x-fetcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text from X (Twitter) posts, which could contain instructions intended to manipulate the agent. The current implementation does not use boundary markers or delimiters when formatting this content into Markdown. Mandatory evidence: 1. Ingestion points: The
fetch_via_fxtwitterandfetch_via_syndicationfunctions infetch_x.pyretrieve data from external web APIs. 2. Boundary markers: Thegenerate_markdownfunction infetch_x.pylacks delimiters or warnings to prevent an agent from interpreting embedded instructions within the fetched tweet text. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local file system (save_markdown_to_dirinscripts/main.py) and perform network requests to download media (download_media_filesinscripts/main.py). 4. Sanitization: While the skill usesyaml.safe_loadfor its own configuration, it does not sanitize or escape the external content retrieved from the web before formatting it into Markdown. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to
api.fxtwitter.comandcdn.syndication.twimg.comto retrieve tweet data, and downloads media files from various hosts found within tweet data (e.g.,pbs.twimg.com) when the media download feature is enabled. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent instructions in
SKILL.mdinvolve using shell commands such astest -fto verify the existence of configuration files in project and user directories.
Audit Metadata