ralph-wiggum-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script
scripts/ralph-loop-example.pyusessubprocess.Popenandsubprocess.runto execute system commands. Specifically, it invokesopencode runwith agent-supplied content and performs Git operations (git add,git commit). While functional for a developer tool, this allows the agent to execute shell commands within the project environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents and provides templates for an 'Adversary Sub-Agent' (in
HIERARCHICAL_AGENTS.mdandPROMPT-ADVERSARY.md). These instructions use adversarial framing, such as 'BREAK the implementation,' 'Take the role of an attacker,' and 'Assume the code is WRONG until proven otherwise.' While intended for security verification, this uses role-play and jailbreak-style patterns to bypass typical AI safety constraints. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The Ralph Loop engine possesses a significant attack surface as it is designed to ingest and process data from
TODO.md,SPEC.md, and project source files. - Ingestion points: Reads
TODO.md,SPEC.md,AGENTS.md, and the entire project codebase. - Boundary markers: Relies on standard Markdown headers; no explicit security delimiters or sanitization for embedded instructions are present.
- Capability inventory: The engine can write files, execute shell commands (via
opencode), perform Git operations, and send network requests (via the Slack plugin example). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for instructions embedded within the processed project files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/generate-ralph-loop.shgenerator script bootstraps a project environment that depends on several external Python packages, includingpyyaml,pydantic,structlog,pluggy, and OpenTelemetry components. It also references thewojons/skillsrepository for installation vianpx.
Audit Metadata