ai-multimodal
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/media_optimizer.pyuses theeval()function to calculate the frame rate (fps) from ther_frame_ratefield provided byffprobe. Because this metadata is derived from the media file being optimized, a maliciously crafted file containing Python code in its frame rate metadata could lead to arbitrary code execution when the optimization utility is run. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries (
ffmpegandffprobe) usingsubprocess.runwithinscripts/media_optimizer.py. Although arguments are passed as a list to mitigate shell injection, the invocation of system-level utilities on untrusted files represents a significant capability that could be exploited if vulnerabilities exist in the underlying media libraries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Multimedia files (audio, video, images) and PDFs processed through
scripts/gemini_batch_process.pyandscripts/document_converter.py. - Boundary markers: The prompts sent to the LLM do not utilize explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore instructions embedded within the source media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is explicitly granted
BashandWritetool access inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Extracted text and transcriptions from untrusted documents and media are not sanitized before being interpolated into LLM prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and installs official, well-known libraries such as
google-genai(Google's official Python SDK),Pillow, andpypdf. These are considered safe sources. - [SAFE]: API key management follows industry best practices, instructing the user to store the
GEMINI_API_KEYin environment variables or local.envfiles that are prioritized correctly by the scripts.
Audit Metadata