mcp-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of external MCP servers as subprocesses. It utilizes the
@modelcontextprotocol/sdkto manage connections and tool calls viaStdioClientTransport. The specific commands and arguments executed are sourced from a local configuration file (.claude/.mcp.json) which is managed by the user. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions guide users to install Node.js dependencies using
npm installand recommend the installation of thegemini-clitool for enhanced integration. These are documented steps for utilizing standard MCP tooling. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting metadata from external servers.
- Ingestion points: The skill dynamically fetches tool, prompt, and resource definitions from configured MCP servers in
scripts/mcp-client.ts. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers are identified in the prompt templates that would delimit server-provided tool descriptions from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the execution of any capability exposed by the configured servers, which can include powerful operations like file system manipulation or browser automation.
- Sanitization: Descriptions and schemas received from servers are stored and presented to the LLM without sanitization, relying on the trust established with the configured server endpoints.
Audit Metadata