mcp-management

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of external MCP servers as subprocesses. It utilizes the @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to manage connections and tool calls via StdioClientTransport. The specific commands and arguments executed are sourced from a local configuration file (.claude/.mcp.json) which is managed by the user.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions guide users to install Node.js dependencies using npm install and recommend the installation of the gemini-cli tool for enhanced integration. These are documented steps for utilizing standard MCP tooling.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting metadata from external servers.
  • Ingestion points: The skill dynamically fetches tool, prompt, and resource definitions from configured MCP servers in scripts/mcp-client.ts.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers are identified in the prompt templates that would delimit server-provided tool descriptions from the agent's internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill enables the execution of any capability exposed by the configured servers, which can include powerful operations like file system manipulation or browser automation.
  • Sanitization: Descriptions and schemas received from servers are stored and presented to the LLM without sanitization, relying on the trust established with the configured server endpoints.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 09:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mcp-management