lark-workflow-action-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from meeting minutes and AI-generated summaries which could potentially contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from external documents using
lark-cli docs +fetchandlark-cli minutes +getin Steps 3A and 3B. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly mandates a human-confirmation step (Step 5: "MUST展示行动项清单,等待用户确认") which acts as a critical security boundary before any write operations.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to create tasks via
lark-cli task +createand send IM messages vialark-cli im +messages-send. - Sanitization: The skill uses structured extraction rules (Step 4) to transform unstructured text into specific fields (who, what, when), reducing the likelihood of raw instruction execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the
lark-clibinary and references multiple configuration files from LarkSuite's official GitHub repository. These are verified components of a well-known technology service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
lark-clitool to perform authenticated operations within the Lark/Feishu ecosystem, including searching meetings, accessing drive files, and managing tasks. This behavior is consistent with the skill's stated purpose.
Audit Metadata