lark-workflow-doc-summarizer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external Feishu/Lark documents which are retrieved via the lark-cli docs +fetch command. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where an attacker could embed malicious instructions within a document to manipulate the AI's output or trigger unintended tool usage.
  • Ingestion points: Document content is fetched in SKILL.md (Step 2) using lark-cli docs +fetch.
  • Boundary markers: The workflow does not specify clear delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content during summarization.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities to search the drive (drive files search) and modify or create documents (docs +update, docs +create).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the document content is described before it is passed to the AI for processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external configuration and shared logic from the larksuite/cli repository on GitHub. These references target official resources from a well-known service provider.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute several shell commands using the lark-cli binary, including auth login, wiki spaces get_node, docs +fetch, drive files search, and docs +update. These commands are necessary for the skill's stated functionality of document management and summarization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 04:50 AM