lark-workflow-doc-summarizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external Feishu/Lark documents which are retrieved via the
lark-cli docs +fetchcommand. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where an attacker could embed malicious instructions within a document to manipulate the AI's output or trigger unintended tool usage. - Ingestion points: Document content is fetched in
SKILL.md(Step 2) usinglark-cli docs +fetch. - Boundary markers: The workflow does not specify clear delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content during summarization.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities to search the drive (
drive files search) and modify or create documents (docs +update,docs +create). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the document content is described before it is passed to the AI for processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external configuration and shared logic from the
larksuite/clirepository on GitHub. These references target official resources from a well-known service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute several shell commands using the
lark-clibinary, includingauth login,wiki spaces get_node,docs +fetch,drive files search, anddocs +update. These commands are necessary for the skill's stated functionality of document management and summarization.
Audit Metadata