xiaoyuzhou-transcript-summarizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinsrc/xyz_skill/audio_splitter.pyto executeffmpegandffprobefor audio processing and duration detection. While these use argument lists rather than shell strings, they represent a significant command execution surface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
src/xyz_skill/transcription.py, theCustomCommandTranscriberclass enables the execution of arbitrary shell commands defined in aconfig.yamlfile. Although it utilizesshlex.splitto prevent simple argument injection, it allows the agent to run any local binary specified in the user-provided configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it fetches and processes untrusted audio content which is converted to text and then summarized by the AI.
- Ingestion points: Podcast content is fetched from external Xiaoyuzhou URLs, transcribed, and saved to
transcripts/full_transcript.txtbefore being read by the agent insrc/xyz_skill/summarizer.py. - Boundary markers: The summary instruction in
summarizer.pyprovides the file path to the agent but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the transcript content itself. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system, download external files via
requests, and execute shell commands viasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization, filtering, or instruction-stripping performed on the transcript text before it is presented to the AI for summarization.
Audit Metadata