encoding-toolkit

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data through the INPUT variable and passes it to powerful execution environments without sufficient isolation.
  • Ingestion points: The INPUT variable is used across all conversion workflows in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to treat the input strictly as data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell commands (base64, xxd) and a full Python 3 interpreter.
  • Sanitization: The input is not sanitized or escaped before being interpolated into scripts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell heredocs to dynamically generate Python scripts at runtime. The INPUT variable is placed inside triple-quoted string literals (data = """${INPUT}"""). A malicious user could provide an input containing triple-quotes to break out of the string literal and execute arbitrary Python code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using user-supplied variables, such as echo -n "$INPUT" | base64. This pattern can lead to command injection if the underlying shell environment does not properly escape or handle special characters within variables.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 11:17 AM