encoding-toolkit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell Command Injection via Variable Interpolation.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Steps 1, 3, and 4), the variable${INPUT}is interpolated into a Python heredoc block<<PYEOF. Because the heredoc delimiter is unquoted, the shell evaluates any command substitutions (e.g.,`command`or$(command)) within the input string before the Python interpreter is launched. - Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Step 2), the commandpython3 -c "... s = '${INPUT}' ..."allows for Python code injection if the input contains a single quote ('), enabling an attacker to escape the string context and execute arbitrary Python logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Argument Injection via
echo. - Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Step 2), the use ofecho "$INPUT" | base64is susceptible to flag injection if the user input starts with a hyphen (e.g.,-e), potentially leading to unexpected shell behavior.
Audit Metadata