ioc-extract
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can read arbitrary file paths from the local filesystem based on user-provided input.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the workflow takes anINPUT_FILEpath and executesTEXT=$(cat "$INPUT_FILE"). - Risk: This capability allows for the potential reading of sensitive system files, environment variables, or credentials if they are accessible to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network requests to remote URLs provided by the user to fetch content for analysis.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the commandTEXT=$(curl -sL "$INPUT_FILE")fetches data from a user-controlled URL. - Risk: This introduces a risk of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), allowing the agent to potentially probe internal network resources or fetch malicious data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands and Python here-docs to process and transform data.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdusescurl,cat,grep,wc, and multiple instances of `python3 - <<'PYEOF'` to execute logic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (logs, files, or web content) and presents it to the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
INPUT_SOURCE(file path, URL, or pasted text) processed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the analyzed logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network access (
curl), filesystem access (reading logs/writing to/tmp), and shell execution capabilities. - Sanitization: The skill performs "defanging" (e.g., converting
.to[.]), but this is a security formatting step for sharing IOCs and does not sanitize the input against malicious AI instructions.
Audit Metadata