secret-scan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow is vulnerable to multiple forms of command injection due to unsafe handling of user-provided filesystem paths.
- Evidence: In Step 2, the shell variable
${SAFE_NAME}is used in a redirection without sufficient quoting:> "$OUTDIR/secrets_combined_${SAFE_NAME}.json". If the path contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,; command ;), they will be executed by the shell. - Evidence: In Step 4, variables derived from the path (like
$COMBINED) are interpolated into a Python script executed viapython3 -c. This allows for Python code injection if the path contains single quotes and Python syntax. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches tools and version information from external repositories and APIs.
- Evidence: It retrieves gitleaks version data from
api.github.comand downloads binary release archives fromgithub.com. - Evidence: It also recommends using
go installto fetchtrufflehogfrom its official GitHub repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (file paths and file contents) while possessing high-privilege capabilities, creating an indirect injection surface.
- Ingestion points: System environment variables (
SECSKILL_SCAN_PATH) and the raw output of the secret scanning tools. - Boundary markers: There are no protective markers or instructions used to prevent the agent from interpreting data as commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands, access the filesystem, and perform network requests.
- Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on inputs before they are used in sensitive shell or Python contexts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata