spec-to-code-compliance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to execute shell commands to interact with a local security toolset.
- Evidence: Step 4 in
SKILL.mdcontains a bash code block that executescd "${HOME}/mitrize"andpython3 scripts/query_attack_md.pywith user-supplied keywords. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on the execution of external Python scripts (
query_attack_md.py) that are expected to exist in a specific directory on the host system but are not provided as part of the skill's own package. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external specifications and source code, which could be used to deliver malicious instructions to the agent.
- Ingestion points: The
SPEC_SOURCEinput (which accepts URLs and file paths) and theCODEBASE_PATHinput are used to populate the agent's context during the requirement extraction phase in Step 1. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define or recommend the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to wrap the untrusted specification text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and read files from the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: Absent. The workflow instructs the agent to parse text directly from the sources without performing validation or escaping of the input data.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external sources for specifications and documentation.
- Evidence: The skill points to RFC documents at
rfc-editor.organd references a public GitHub repository from Trail of Bits in the Notes section. These are documented as references to well-known organizations and services.
Audit Metadata