waf-detect
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
TARGET_URLvariable directly within shell command blocks to executewafw00fandcurl. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the input is not strictly validated, allowing a maliciously crafted URL (e.g., containing;or&) to execute arbitrary commands on the host environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow executes
pip install wafw00f --quietto install thewafw00fpackage from the Python Package Index (PyPI) at runtime. This involves downloading and installing third-party code during the skill's execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by fetching and displaying response headers from user-provided URLs.
- Ingestion points: Response headers and HTTP status codes are captured via
curlrequests to theTARGET_URLinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the target's response headers.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution, package installation via
pip, and network operations viacurlandwafw00f. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the response data retrieved from the remote target before it is processed or displayed in the agent context.
Audit Metadata