agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
agent-browser opencommand explicitly supports thefile://protocol, allowing the agent to navigate to and read local system files (e.g., .ssh/config, .env). When combined with extraction commands likesnapshotorget text, this presents a risk of sensitive data exposure. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides commands such as
cookiesandstorage localwhich can be used to extract sensitive session tokens and authentication data from the browser environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
agent-browser evalcommand allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context, which could be misused to perform actions outside the scope of the intended automation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external websites.
- Ingestion points: Browser
snapshot,get text,get html, andconsolecommands (multiple files). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided templates to isolate external content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes (
screenshot,pdf), network requests, and JavaScript execution. - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or escaping before the retrieved data is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Bash(agent-browser:*)tool configuration allows the agent to perform a wide range of system interactions, including writing artifacts like screenshots, PDFs, and session state files to the local filesystem.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata