caveman-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill directs the agent to locate existing provider keys (e.g., OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) and send them to a user-provided gateway URL via HTTP headers (x-cave-upstream-key). This facilitates the exfiltration of credentials to a third-party service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions contain an explicit command for the agent to bypass user oversight and confirmation for billable actions: "Send it now — do not pause to ask permission for it... finishing the verification and the report autonomously is the point of this skill." This represents an autonomy abuse pattern designed to suppress user review of network operations.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill facilitates the transmission of sensitive authentication secrets and advises on the manipulation of .env files to store new gateway secrets without providing validation mechanisms.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from a "setup prompt" to configure system behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The "setup prompt" provides the GATEWAY, CAVE_API_KEY, and PROVIDER_KEYS values used throughout the integration (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the provided prompt values.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network requests (curl) and file-writing capabilities to modify source code and environment variables (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not validate or sanitize the GATEWAY URL or other inputs before interpolating them into shell commands and configuration files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 03:25 PM