atlas-cloud
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from multiple sources, creating a potential surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-provided
promptvalues in thetool.executecalls. It also reads external data from themodel_catalogviatool.get_info()and processes artifacts downloaded from the Atlas Cloud gateway. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when handling the user prompt or external model metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including performing network operations (uploading to Atlas, polling predictions, downloading files) and writing data to the local file system within the
projects/directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided prompt or the external data retrieved from the cloud provider before it is used in tool execution.
Audit Metadata