avatar-video

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user-supplied content, such as speech scripts and avatar appearance prompts, which are then transmitted to an external AI service for processing.
  • Ingestion points: Script text inputs in references/video-generation.md and descriptive prompts for AI-generated avatars in references/photo-avatars.md.
  • Boundary markers: Code examples lack explicit boundary markers or instructions designed to isolate user-supplied content from API control logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (interacting with HeyGen APIs) and local file system writes (saving generated assets).
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization mechanisms are included in the documented examples to mitigate the risk of malicious payload injection within user scripts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The integration with Remotion documented in references/remotion-integration.md involves bundling and executing code at runtime to generate video compositions, which constitutes a dynamic execution pattern.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation includes shell-based command examples (using curl) for API interactions across multiple files, defining the operational methods used by the agent to perform tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs downloads of video and image assets from official HeyGen infrastructure (heygen.com, heygen.ai). These references target well-known service domains essential to the skill's primary function.
Recommendations
  • CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 01:56 AM