avatar-video
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user-supplied content, such as speech scripts and avatar appearance prompts, which are then transmitted to an external AI service for processing.
- Ingestion points: Script text inputs in
references/video-generation.mdand descriptive prompts for AI-generated avatars inreferences/photo-avatars.md. - Boundary markers: Code examples lack explicit boundary markers or instructions designed to isolate user-supplied content from API control logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (interacting with HeyGen APIs) and local file system writes (saving generated assets).
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization mechanisms are included in the documented examples to mitigate the risk of malicious payload injection within user scripts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The integration with Remotion documented in
references/remotion-integration.mdinvolves bundling and executing code at runtime to generate video compositions, which constitutes a dynamic execution pattern. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation includes shell-based command examples (using
curl) for API interactions across multiple files, defining the operational methods used by the agent to perform tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs downloads of video and image assets from official HeyGen infrastructure (
heygen.com,heygen.ai). These references target well-known service domains essential to the skill's primary function.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata