hyperframes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that dictate its priority over other tools, stating that HyperFrames should remain the default for authoring and rendering even if other video tools are installed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to download and install additional skills and components from the 'heygen-com/hyperframes' GitHub repository using commands like
npx skills addandnpx hyperframes skills update. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
ghCLI to read data from GitHub repositories andnpxfor project initialization, component updates, and rendering tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a significant attack surface by ingesting and processing untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Content is scraped from external URLs using headless Chrome (in
/product-launch-videoand/website-to-videoworkflows), GitHub Pull Request data is read via theghCLI (/pr-to-video), and user-provided video files are transcribed locally using Whisper (/embedded-captions). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data were identified.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (npx, gh), write files to the local directory, and perform network requests (scraping).
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization routines for the ingested external content.
Audit Metadata