threejs-world-generation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes executable code files, including index.html, world-spec.js, and world-runtime.js, to the local filesystem during the world construction process.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input in the form of 'world briefs' to define the 3D environment. This data is interpolated into a structured specification used to generate executable scripts.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided text or structured briefs are processed in SKILL.md to extract constraints.
  • Boundary markers: The skill requires the agent to maintain separate lists for explicit_constraints (user-supplied) and inferred_details (agent-supplied).
  • Capability inventory: The threejs_world tool writes multiple files and copies assets to the local projects/ directory.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping of user strings before they are embedded into the generated world.json and .js files.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The references/worldclaw-principles.md file cites a source paper (WorldClaw) with a future publication date of 2026 and an arXiv ID (2608.05248v1) that is currently invalid or hallucinated, which constitutes misleading metadata.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the threejs_asset_catalog tool to download and install 3D model catalogs to the local project directory. The skill explicitly requires local copying to prevent remote asset fetching at render time.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 01:56 AM