threejs-world-generation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes executable code files, including
index.html,world-spec.js, andworld-runtime.js, to the local filesystem during the world construction process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input in the form of 'world briefs' to define the 3D environment. This data is interpolated into a structured specification used to generate executable scripts.
- Ingestion points: User-provided text or structured briefs are processed in
SKILL.mdto extract constraints. - Boundary markers: The skill requires the agent to maintain separate lists for
explicit_constraints(user-supplied) andinferred_details(agent-supplied). - Capability inventory: The
threejs_worldtool writes multiple files and copies assets to the localprojects/directory. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping of user strings before they are embedded into the generated
world.jsonand.jsfiles. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
references/worldclaw-principles.mdfile cites a source paper (WorldClaw) with a future publication date of 2026 and an arXiv ID (2608.05248v1) that is currently invalid or hallucinated, which constitutes misleading metadata. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the
threejs_asset_catalogtool to download and install 3D model catalogs to the local project directory. The skill explicitly requires local copying to prevent remote asset fetching at render time.
Audit Metadata